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Abstract
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a prole
of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public fa-
cilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from
congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the
class of rules satisfying Pareto-e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity
and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects lo-
cations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest
groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that re-
spectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In
particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it
partitions the set of agents into a xed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such
rule can be viewed as a collection of xed-populations generalized peak-
selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations,
in a way that we describe.
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1 Introduction
We consider a generalization of the unidimensional voting model studied by
Black (1948) and Moulin (1980). A collective decision problem is described
by a set of agents, a prole of single-peaked preferences over the real line,
and a number k of public facilities to be located e.g. public libraries. Each
public facility is non-excludable and does not exhibit congestion. Thus, it is
a pure public good. Each agent has preferences over sets of locations that
reect the fact that she will use only her preferred facility among the k that
are provided. We search for a rule that decides on how to locate the facilities,
in any possible collective decision problem. We follow the axiomatic method.
In addition to Pareto-e¢ ciency, we search for rules that satisfy two normative
properties, which we introduce in this paper, object-population monotonicity
and sovereignty.
Public facilities should be interpreted in a broad sense. They could be
actual facilities, such as wireless towers, to be located in space. They could be
varieties of software to be provided to a community of users. In this example,
the locations represent di¤erent program varieties. They could also be the
o¢ cial languages for a linguistically diversied society. We will use this third
example, to explain the content of our axioms in a concrete manner.
The European Union (henceforth, EU) has to select a set of o¢ cial working
languages for its main tribune, among the set of all the languages used in EU
countries.1 Not all these languages can be selected as o¢ cial working language.
How should the EU decide which languages to select as o¢ cial working ones? In
addition, how should it modify this selection after an enlargement? We would
like to have a method for selecting o¢ cial working languages that respects a
1Currently, the o¢ cial working languages of the EU are English, French and German. For
a more detailed discussion concerning the choice of o¢ cial languages in the EU, see the paper
by Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh and Weber (2006).
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few desirable properties.2 As a rst requirement, we require Pareto-e¢ ciency.
The selected set of languages should be such that no other set with the same
cardinality is weakly preferred by all EU citizens and strictly preferred by at
least one citizen. In addition, we are interested in two new properties object-
population monotonicity and sovereignty. Roughly speaking, object-population
monotonicity says that if a new group of citizens joins the EU, and at the same
time, the number of o¢ cial working languages increases, in such a way that the
increase of the number of languages compensates the increase in linguistic diver-
sity in the EU due to the arrival of new citizens, then all agents initially present
should weakly benet from the change. Last, suppose that a single language
needs to be selected as communicating language within EU institutions. Sov-
ereignty loosely says that any language could be selected as the unique working
language, provided that an appropriately selected, and possibly large, group
of interestdefending this particular language, is brought into the EU.
Equipped with these axioms, we provide a complete characterization of the
class of rules that jointly satisfy them. A priority rule operates as follows. First,
it partitions the EU population into linguistic groups, i.e. groups of citizens
that share the same preferred language. Second, it ranks these linguistic groups
according to some predetermined priority order that can depend on the identities
of their members and their full preferences over all languages. The rule then
selects the preferred languages of the top k groups in the priority order. Our
main result is that any rule that satises our three axioms is a priority rule
(Theorem 1). All priority rules are e¢ cient, and object-population monotonic,
but not all are sovereign. We characterize the class of priority rules that satisfy
all three properties (Theorem 1). The corresponding set is large within the set
of priority rules, in the following sense: Any priority rule can be approximated
2In the process of its enlargement, the EU may repeatedly face the choice of adding new
languages. Hence, we need a method a rule in the language of collective choicethat can be
used in di¤erent situations.
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with a sequence of rules that satisfy all three properties (Theorem 2). Priority
rules form a rich class. In particular, it includes an interesting subclass of
majoritarian rules that rank linguistic groups according to their cardinality.
Next, we investigate on priority rules that satisfy additional desirable proper-
ties, such as anonymity, hiding-proofness,median-selection and strategy-proofness.
Unfortunately, no priority rule selects the median voter when a single language
needs to be selected and the number of agents is odd. The priority rules that
are strategy-proof form an interesting subclass of hierarchical rules (Theorem
3). Each such rule partitions the EU population into a xed hierarchy of priority
levels. Each such rule can also be described as a linked collection of generalized
peak-selecting median rules (Moulin, 1980) restricted in a particular way. We
provide a complete description of the linkage across populations imposed by our
axioms on such a collection.
The problem of locating a single facility is well-studied in the voting litera-
ture. Moulin (1980), Ching (1997), Barberà and Jackson (1994) among others,
have studied the strategic properties of rules for locating a single facility. Other
scholars have studied rules for this problem, that satisfy normative properties.
The principle of solidarity says that when circumstances change, all agents not
responsible for the change should be a¤ected in the same direction.3 Thomson
(1993), Ching and Thomson (1996), Vohra (1998) and Klaus (2001) investigate
the two main formulations in this context.4 In all the papers cited in this para-
3Thomson (1995, 1999a, 1999b) provides excellent surveys on the di¤erent formulations
of the solidarity principle and its applications to di¤erent economic contexts. Replacement-
domination operates on preference proles for a xed population. It says that when the
preferences of one agent change, all the other agents, whose preferences are kept xed, should
be a¤ected in the same direction. Population-monotonicity operates on preference proles
for a variable population. It says that when new agents join the economy, all the agents who
were initially present should all be a¤ected in the same direction.
4Gordon (2007b) studies the solidarity principle in the location of a public facility on
a cycle. Gordon (2007b) generalizes this literature on the solidarity principle to a more
abstract non-geometric setting that contains location problems of single and multiple facilities
as special cases.
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graph, the rules select the location of a single facility, hence resources are kept
xed.
The problem of locating two facilities was studied rst by Miyagawa (1998,
2001). In these works, Miyagawa proposes to extend preferences over single lo-
cations to nite sets of locations according to themax-extension. This extension
compares nite sets of locations by comparing only their best element. Ehlers
(2002, 2003) also studies this problem, but extends preferences in a lexicographic
manner. Both Miyagawa (1998, 2001) and Ehlers (2002, 2003) follow the nor-
mative route. They look for rules that satisfy either replacement-domination
or population-monotonicity. But once again, the set of resources is kept xed,
since their rules always locate exactly two facilities. In contrast, we do not
restrict the set of facilities to any particular cardinality. Thus, our rules pre-
scribe how to locate any number of facilities. In addition, our object-population
monotonicity axiom operates across di¤erent populations and across problems
with di¤erent numbers of facilities. It can be viewed as a formulation of the
solidarity principle in a context where both population and resources can vary.
Our work resembles the work of these scholars in style, in the sense that we
also characterize families of rules using axioms, but the axioms we study are
di¤erent, and the set of location problems we cover is larger.
Barberà and Beviá (2002, 2005) and Ju (2007) also study the location of
multiple facilities. They focus on consistency. This property says that when one
k 1 facility and its usersare simultaneously removed, the remaining location
should remain unchanged. These authors show that the set of rules that satisfy
this property and additional interesting requirements is large, but they do not
provide a characterization. In contrast, we obtain several characterizations on
the basis of object-population monotonicity and other axioms.
Our main contribution is that we identify and axiomatize the class of priority
rules, in an environement for which few rules have been proposed. These rules
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have a simple parametric structure. The structure, in turn, facilitates further
analysis: It is relatively easy to characterize the set of priority rules that satisfy
an additional axiom. To obtain our main characterization, we introduce two
new axioms. These axioms are meaningful in the context of the location of
public facilities, but they also are of independent interest, and could be futher
investigated in other contexts.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
and necessary denitions. In Section 3, we introduce priorities and priority
rules. In Section 4, we present various examples of priorities and priority rules.
In Section 5, we present our main axioms. In Section 6, we present our main
characterization. In Section 7, we show that the set of rules we characterize is
dense within the set of the priority rules for an appropriately chosen topology.
In Section 8, we study the subclasses of priority rules that satisfy respectively
anonymity, and hiding-proofness. We also show that no priority rule selects the
median in problems with one good and a population with an odd cardinality.
In Section 9, we study the subclass of strategy-proof priority rules.
2 The model
The following denitions are useful throughout the paper. A binary relation
over a set Z is a subset of Z2: A binary relation r over Z is transitive if for all
x; y; z 2 Z; we have (x r y and y r z) =) (x r z): It is reexive if for all
x 2 Z; we have x r x: It is complete if for all x; y 2 Z; we have either x r y
or y r x: It is symmetric if for all x; y 2 Z; we have (x r y) =) (y r x) : It is
asymmetric if for all x; y 2 Z; we have (x r y) =) : (y r x) : A binary relation
over Z is a weak ordering over Z if it is transitive, reexive and complete. It
is a strict ordering over Z if it is transitive, asymmetric and complete. It is a
weak partial order if it is transitive and reexive. It is an indi¤erence relation
if it is transitive, reexive, and symmetric. We will later introduce other types
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of binary relations.
There is a countably innite set N of potential agents. A population N is a
nite and nonempty subset of N. The population is collectively endowed with a
number k of identical public facilities, each to be located on the real line R. A
typical location on R is denoted by x: An assignment is a menu of locations, i.e.
a nite subset X  R. A k-assignment is an assignment for exactly k facilities,
i.e. a subset X  R such that jXj = k: Let Xk be the class of all k-assignments.
In particular, a 1-assignment is a single location x 2 R, so that X1 = R. Let
X  [k1Xk be the class of all assignments.
A preference over X is a weak ordering over X . Each agent i 2 N has a
preference Ri over X . For each preference Ri, let Pi and Ii stand for the strict
ordering and the indi¤erence relation associated with Ri, respectively. We re-
strict attention to the classR of single-peaked preferences over X ; dened by the
following two conditions. The rst condition is the common single-peakedness
notion, for preferences over single locations on the real line. The second con-
dition extends preferences from single locations to menus.5 A preference Ri is
single-peaked if the following holds.
i) There is a location p (Ri), such that for all x; y 2 R satisfying either
x < y  p(Ri) or p (Ri)  y > x, we have y Pi x: The location p (Ri) is
called the peak of preference Ri:
ii) For all X; Y 2 X ; we let X Ri Y if there is x 2 X such that for all y 2 Y;
we have x Ri y.
For each population N; a preference prole for N is a list RN = (Ri)i2N 2
RN : More generally, a preference prole is a preference prole for some popu-
5There are di¤erent ways to extend preferences over points to preferences over sets. Con-
sistent with the denition of a public facility used in this paper, we consider the max-extension
of preferences used by Miyagawa (2001).
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lation N:6 For each prole RN and each subpopulation K  N; let RK denote
the subprole (Ri)i2K : For each prole RN 2 RN , let p(RN) be the set of peak
locations for RN ; i.e. p (RN)  fp(Ri) : i 2 Ng : For each k > 0; let Pk be the
set of preference proles RN with a number of distinct peak locations greater
than or equal to k; i.e. such that k  jp (RN)j : A problem is a pair (k;RN)
such that k is a positive integer, and RN 2 Pk.7
A rule is a sequence f = ff1; f2; :::g of mappings fk : Pk!Xk: For each
problem (k;RN), the rule f prescribes an assignment in Xk:8 For each k  1;
the set of mappings fk is XPkk : Therefore, the set of all rules is the set
Q1
k=1XPkk :
3 Priority rules
Let us introduce a class F of rules which will play an important role in our
results. A prole RM is peak-unanimous if all the preferences of this prole have
the same peak, i.e. p (RM) is a singleton. Let T be the set of peak-unanimous
proles. For any two peak-unanimous proles RL and R0M ; we say that RL
and R0M are compatible if they have distinct peaks and disjoint populations, i.e.
p (RL) 6= p (R0M) and L \M = ;:
We now introduce the class of priorities over some nonempty subset S of T .
Let be a binary relation over S. The binary relation is almost complete if for
allRL; RM 2 S; we have (RL  RM or RM  RL), (RL and RM are compatible) :9
It is almost transitive if for all RK ; RL; RM 2 S; such that RK and RM are com-
patible, we have (RK  RL and RL  RM) =) (RK  RM). The binary
6A prole RN species a population N and each of its agentspreferences.
7The restriction k  jp (RN )j allows us to focus on non-trivial cases. When k > jp (RN )j ;
it is possible to locate one facility at each peak location, so that the welfare of each agent is
maximized. Locating the remaining facilities does not a¤ect any agents welfare.
8Our denitions rule out locating more than one facility at the same point. Under single-
peaked preferences, and for the class of problems we consider, Pareto-e¢ ciency would exclude
duplication anyway.
9In particular, an almost complete binary relation  over T is never reexive.
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relation  is a priority over S if it is asymmetric, almost transitive and almost
complete.10 For each nonempty S  T ; let PS be the set of priorities over S:
For each prole RN ; the peak-unanimous subprole RM of RN is maximal
if p (RM) \ p
 
RNnM

= ;: Any two distinct maximal peak-unanimous subpro-
les are compatible. It follows that the collection of maximal peak-unanimous
subproles of some prole is strictly ordered by any priority (see footnote 10).
We are now ready to dene the family of priority rules, parametrized by the
set PT : For each  2 PT ; the priority rule f associated with  is dened as
follows. Let (k;RN) be an arbitrary problem. Then the priority  strictly
ranks the maximal peak-unanimous subproles in the decomposition of RN and
fk (RN) selects the peak locations of the top k maximal peak-unanimous sub-
proles for  : In more precise terms, fk (RN) is the k-assignment such that
fk (RN)  p (RN) ; and for all two maximal peak-unanimous subproles RM
and RL in RN ; if p (RM)  fk (RN) and p (RL)  fk (RN) ; then RM  RL: Let
F be the set of priority rules.
4 Examples
In this section, we provide a few examples that illustrate how large and diverse
the set of priorities is. We rst present some priorities that can be described in a
simple way (Examples 1, 2 and 3), and then move on to more complex priorities,
for which it is convenient to use a lexicographic formulation (Examples 4 to 8).
Example 1: The left-peaks priority LP is such that, for all compatible RM ;
RN 2 T ; we have RM LP RN if and only if p (RM) < p (RN) : The left-peaks
10A priority  is not a partial order, as it is not fully transitive. However, priorities have
the following important property. The restriction of a priority  on any set S of pairwise
compatible unanimous proles is a strict ordering. If this set is nite, the priority  has a
greatest (or top) element in S. A top element for  typically does not generally exist on a
set of unanimous proles whose elements are not pairwise compatible, even if it is a nite set.
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rule fLP is the priority rule dened by LP : An alternative denition of the
rule fLP is that it selects, for each problem (k;RN), the k-assignment X such
that for all i 2 N , if p(Ri) =2 X, then p(Ri) > max(X).
Example 2: The right-peaks priority RP is such that, for all compatible RM ;
RN 2 T ; we have RM RP RN if and only if p (RM) > p (RN) : The right-peaks
rule fRP is the priority rule dened by RP : An alternative denition of the
rule fRP is that it selects, for each problem (k;RN), the k-assignment X such
that for all i 2 N , if p(Ri) =2 X, then p(Ri) < min(X).11
Example 3: A priority SD is a serial dictatorship if there exists a strict
ordering B of all agents in N such that, for all compatible RM ; RN 2 T ; we
have RM SD RN if and only if there exists i 2 M; such that for all j 2 N; we
have i B j: For example, the strict ordering could be such that for all i; j 2 N;
we have i B j if and only if i < j:12
Lexicographic formulations: Some priorities are easier to describe using a
lexicographic formulation. This means that the priority is determined rst by
a primary criterion that is not always decisive. When the primary criterion is
indecisive, a secondary criterion is used, which can vary depending on the pair
that is being compared.
To formalize this idea, let us introduce the following denitions. Let  be
a weak ordering over T . Let T be the set of indi¤erence classes for  in T .13
11Miyagawa (2001) showed that when jN j  4 and k = 2; the only mappings RN ! X2
satisfying e¢ ciency and replacement-domination are the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks
rule. These solutions are also anonymous and group-strategy-proof. The left-peaks and right-
peaks priorities are also trivial hierarchical rules (see Example 4) where all agents belong to
the same unique indi¤erence class.
12The serial dictatorships are extreme cases of hierarchical rules (see Example 4) where
each indi¤erence class is a singleton.
13Requiring  to be a weak ordering rather than an almost complete and almost transitive
(and not asymetric) binary relation on T is important here, as it allows us to refer to the
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For each T 2 T, let T be a priority over T: Finally, let  be a priority over
T . Then, the priority  has the lexicographic formulation  ; (T )T2T if for
all compatible RM ; RN 2 T ; we have RM  RN if and only if RM  RN and
either (i) : (RN  RM) or (ii) There is an indi¤erence class T for  such that
(RM ; RN 2 T and RM T RN).
It should be clear that all priorities admit many lexicographic formulations.
However, there are priorities for which a particular lexicographic formulation is
the most natural and convenient denition. We now present a few examples of
such priorities.
Example 4: A priority H is hierarchical if it admits a lexicographic for-
mulation (; (T )) that satises the following conditions. (i) There is a weak
ordering D of all agents in N, such that, for all RM ; RN 2 T ; we have RM  RN
if and only if there exists i 2M; such that for all j 2 N; we have i D j. (ii) For
each T 2 T; the priority T is either the (restriction to T of) the left-peaks or
(restriction to T of) the right-peaks priority.14
Example 5: A priority M is majoritarian if it admits a lexicographic formu-
lation (; (n)) such that, for all RM ; RN 2 T ; we have RM  RN if and only if
jM j  jN j : The indi¤erence classes are the sets Tn = fRN 2 T : jN j = ng : For
each n  1, the tie-breaking rule n can be any priority. For example, we could
require n to be the left-peaks priority, for all T (left-majoritarian priority) or
the right-peaks priority (right-majoritarian priority).15
indi¤erence classes of .
14In Section 9, we show that hierarchical rules are the only priority rules that are strategy-
proof. One could also dene a more general class of (non strategy-proof) hierarchical rules
by allowing the T to be any priority, non necessarily the left-peaks or right-peaks priorities.
15We can similarly dene the family of minoritarian priorities by requiring instead that
RM  RN i¤ jM j  jN j :
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Example 6: A priority M is x0-centralist-majoritarian if it admits a lex-
icographic formulation (; (v)), such that there are a location x0 2 R (the
center), a distance D(x; y) on R and an index u : f1; 2; :::g R+ ! R, where
u (n; d) is increasing in n and decreasing in d, such that, for all RM ; RN 2 T ;
we have RM  RN if and only if
u (jM j ; D (p (RM) ; x0))  u (jN j ; D (p (RN) ; x0)) :
The indi¤erence classes are the sets
Tv = fRN 2 T : u (jM j ; D (p (RM) ; x0)) = vg :
For each such class, the tie-breaking rule v can be any priority. For exam-
ple, we could require v to be the left-peaks priority for all v 2 R (left-x0-
centralist-majoritarian priority) or the right-peaks priority for all v 2 R (right-
x0-centralist-majoritarian priority).16
We conclude this section by an illustration of how the left-majoritarian rule
fLM allocates goods for two particular problems. Let N = f1; :::; 10g, k = 2
and the two proles RN and R0N with peak locations distributed as follows.
Prole RN Agents 9,10 6,7,8 1,...,5
Peak locations 0 1 2
Prole R0N Agents 1,2,3 4,5,6 7,8,9 10
Peak locations 0 1 2 3
Let RL0 ; RL1 and RL2 be the maximal peak-unanimous subproles of RN ,
with L0 = f9; 10g, L1 = f6; 7; 8g, and L2 = f1; :::; 5g ; we have jL0j < jL1j <
jL2j ; therefore RL2 LM RL1 LM RL0 ; i.e. f2 (RN) = f1; 2g. Similarly, let
R0M0 ; R
0
M1
R0M2 and R
0
M2
be the maximal peak-unanimous subproles of R0N ,
with M0 = f1; 2; 3g, M1 = f4; 5; 6g, M2 = f7; 8; 9g ; and M3 = f10g ; we
have jM0j = jM1j = jM2j > jM3j ; and p
 
R0M0

< p
 
R0M1

< p
 
R0M2

; thus
R0M0 LM R0M1 LM R0M2 LM R0M3 ; i.e. fLM2 (R0N) = f0; 1g.
16A more general family is obtained by relaxing the monotonicity asumptions on u:
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5 Axioms
Our rst axiom is the usual (Pareto)-e¢ ciency axiom. For each prole RN 2
RN and each x; y 2 R, we say that x weakly Pareto-dominates y for prole RN
if x Ri y for each i 2 N . This is denoted by x RN y:
A rule f satises e¢ ciency if, for each problem (k;RN), there is no k-
assignment X such that X RN fk(RN); and X Pj fk(RN) for some j 2 N .
Any rule that always selects distinct peaks locations is e¢ cient. Therefore,
all priority rules are e¢ cient. Next, we would like our rules to satisfy a fairness
condition when resources and population vary. First, when the population is
held xed but resources vary, it is natural to require that the agents who are
initially present in the economy, and whose preferences are kept xed, all weakly
gain as the number of available facilities increases.
A rule satises object-monotonicity if, for each problem (k;RN) such that
k < jp(RN)j; we have fk+1(RN) RN fk(RN).
All priority rules are object-monotonic, since they satisfy, for each such
problem, the stronger condition fk(RN) fk+1(RN). Object-monotonicity turns
out to be very weak in this model. Many rules that have very little in common
satisfy this axiom. This motivates looking at changes in both resources and
population.17 We require that if both resources and population increase, and
the new resources are su¢ cient to fully satisfy the newcomers, then the agents
who are initially present in the economy, and whose preferences are kept xed,
17One could also study changes in population, while ressources are kept xed. The natural
axiom for this case, population monotonicity, requires that when new agents join the economy
(for a xed number of facilities), all the agents that were initially present weakly lose. This
property is studied in this model by Miyagawa (1998), and by Ehlers (2003) in a model similar
to this one. Both restrict attention to the case of two facilities. Gordon (2006) shows that
this axiom has strong general implications in the broader class of pure public goods, of which
this model is a special case.
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all weakly gain from this double expansion. In fact, we will restrict attention
to changes where exactly one facility is brought into the economy and exactly
one peak-unanimous prole is added to the initial prole. Observe that the
additional facility is indeed su¢ cient to fully satisfy the newcomers, since it
could be located at their common peak.
A rule f satises object-population monotonicity if, for each problem
(k;RN) with k < jp(RN)j; for each peak-unanimous prole RM 2 T such that
N \M = ;; we have fk+1(RN ; RM) RN fk(RN).
Although all the priority rules presented in Examples 1 to 6 satisfy this
axiom, not all priority rules do, as shown in the following example.
Example 7: Let  be the priority such that for all two compatible peak-
unanimous proles RL and RM ; we have RL  RM if either (jLj > jM j and
jLj  3) or (jLj = 1 and jM j = 2) or (jLj = jM j and p (RL) < p (RM)). The
priority rule f dened by violates object-population monotonicity. To see this,
consider a prole Rf1;2;3;4g such that p(R1) = p (R2) < p(R3) < p (R4). There-
fore R1  R3  R4  Rf1;2g. Thus, f1(Rf1;3;4g) = p (R1) and f2(Rf1;2;3;4g) =
fp (R3) ; p (R4)g : Therefore, f1(Rf1;3;4g) P1 f2(Rf1;2;3;4g), in contradiction with
object-population monotonicity.
More generally, one can show that a priority rule satises object-population
monotonicity if and only if the priority  that denes it is such that, bringing
more agents into a peak-unanimous prole cannot lower its priority by more
than one step along any chain of compatible peak-unanimous proles. In other
words, there are no four peak-unanimous proles RM , RK , RH and RL such that
p (RM) = p (RL) and RM  RH  RK  RM[L. In example 7, the violation
occurs because the axiom requires that agent 1; who has the same peak as the
newcomer agent 2; also weakly gain from the change. This suggests the following
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weakening of the axiom. Consider any prole enlargement. Among the agents
initially present, some may have the same peak location as the newcomers (call
them allies), and others may not (call them opponents). The weaker version
of the axiom requires that all opponents weakly gain, and requires nothing for
allies.
A rule f satises object-population monotonicity  if, for each problem
(k;RN) with k < jp(RN)j; for each peak-unanimous prole RM 2 T such that
N \M = ;; and for all i 2 N such that p (Ri) 6= p (RM) ; we have fk+1(RN ; RM)
RN fk(RN).
It turns out that any priority rule satises this weaker version of the axiom.18
This observation brings out the following question: are all rules that satisfy
e¢ ciency and object-population monotonicity  priority rules? The answer is
negative, as shown in the following example.
Example 8: LetB be the strict ordering onR such that, for all x; x0; y; y0; z; z0 2
R satisfying x < x0 < 0 < y < y0 < 1 < z < z0, we have 0B1ByBy0BxBx0BzB
z0. Let  be the priority such that, for any two peak-unanimous proles RL and
R0M , we have RL  R0M if and only if p(RL)B p(R0M). Let g be the priority rule
dened by . Let f be the rule such that, for each problem (k;RN), if k = 1
and p(RN) = f 1; 1g, then fk(RN)  f12g, and otherwise fk(RN)  gk(RN).
The rule f satises e¢ ciency and object-population monotonicity , but it is
not a priority rule.
18Even the strong version of the axiom does not imply object-monotonicity. However,
object-population monotonicity , e¢ ciency and sovereignty do imply object-monotonicity.
Both versions of object-population monotonicity are also logically independent from popula-
tion monotonicity. The rules presented in Example 5 satisfy object-population monotonicity,
but not population-monotonicity. Moreover consider the rule f for which for each problem
(1; RN ), we have f1(RN ) = fLP1 (RN ), and for each k  2 and each problem (k;RN ) ; we have
fk(RN ) = f
RP
k (RN ). This rule satises population monotonicity but not object-population
monotonicity .
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We wish to eliminate rules that present pathologies, as in Example 8. This
leads us to introduce a third axiom. This axiom only restricts the one-facility
component f1 of a rule, as the population varies. It says that the choice y
made by the rule f1 for a given prole RN can be reversed in favor of any given
location x provided that some appropriately selected peak-unanimous prole
RM is brought into the economy in support of x:
A rule f satises sovereignty  if, for each prole RN , each location x 2
Rnf1 (RN), there exists a peak-unanimous prole RM 2 T such thatM\N = ;;
that satises f1 (RN ; RM) = fxg = p (RM).
In fact, we will use the following slightly stronger version of the axiom,
which requires that there are innitely many distinct and compatible such peak-
unanimous proles.
A rule f satises sovereignty if, for each prole RN , each location x 2 R n
f1 (RN), and each population L, there exists a peak-unanimous prole RM 2 T
such that M is disjoint from both L and N; that satises f1 (RN ; RM) = fxg =
p (RM).
The rule presented in Example 8 violates both versions of the axiom. In fact,
we will show in the next section that any e¢ cient, object-population monotonic 
and sovereign rule is a priority rule. However, not all priority rules are sovereign.
While the rules in examples 5, 6 and 7, and some of the rules in examples 3
and 4 are, the ones in examples 1 and 2, and some of the rules in example 3
and 4 are not. We leave it to the reader to verify that a priority  denes a
sovereign priority rule if and only if the following two conditions hold. (i) For all
peak-unanimous RH ; RK 2 T such that RH  RK ; and for any population L,
there exists a peak-unanimous prole RM 2 T such that M is disjoint from K
and L; and satises p (RM) = p (RK) ; and RK[M  RH : (ii) For each RH 2 T
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, each x 6= p (RH) and each population L, there exists a peak-unanimous prole
RM 2 T such that M \ L = ;; and satises p (RM) = x; and RM  RH : Let
PT  PT be the set of priorities over T that satisfy these condition. Let FS  F
be the set of priority rules that are dened by a priority in PT :
6 Main characterization
We are now ready to present our main result.
Theorem 1: A rule f satises e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity 
and sovereignty if and only if f 2 FS.
As we observed in Section 5, it is straightforward to verify that all the
elements of the class FS satisfy the three axioms. Before proving the converse,
we rst present two useful lemmas. The rst one states that object-population
monotonicity  and sovereignty imply the following property.
A rule f satises strong sovereignty if for each problem (k;RN) ; each
location x 2 Rnfk (RN), and each population L, there exists a peak-unanimous
prole RM such that M is disjoint from both L and N; that satises p (RM) =
fxg  fk (RN ; RM).
Lemma 1: If f satises object-population monotonicity  and sov-
ereignty, then it satises strong sovereignty
Proof. Let (k;RN) be an arbitrary problem, let x 2 R be an arbitrary
location, and let L be an arbitrary population. We will prove that there exists
a peak-unanimous prole RM such that M \ (L [N) = ; and p (RM) = fxg 
fk (RN ; RM) : If k = 1; then sovereignty guarantees that this is true. So suppose
instead, that k > 1: Let `  jp(RN)j: We have `  k:
Let RN1 ; : : : ; RN` (k 1) be `  (k  1) distinct maximal peak-unanimous sub-
proles of RN : Let eN  N1 [ : : : [ N` (k 1): We have jp(R eN)j = `   (k   1):
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Let eL  (N n eN)[L: By sovereignty, there exists a prole RM 2 RM such that
M \(eL[ eN) = ;, and p (RM) = fxg = f1(R eN ; RM):We have jp(RNn eN)j = k 1:
By object-population monotonicity , applied k   1 times, we have in particular
fk(R eN ; RM ; RNn eN) RM f1(R eN ; RM): Since f1(RN ; RM) = fxg = p (RM) ; this
implies that x 2 fk(R eN ; RM ; RNn eN); i.e. p (RM) = fxg  fk(RN ; RM): Since
M \ (L [ N) = M \ (eL [ eN) = ;; therefore the population M satises all the
desired properties.
The second lemma shows that the three axioms of the theorem imply that
each public facility must be located at some agents peak location.
A rule f satises peak-selection if for each problem (k;RN), we have
fk(RN)  p (RN).
Lemma 2: If f satises e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity 
and sovereignty, then it satises peak-selection.
Proof : Let f satisfy the three axioms. We prove by induction on k,
that each fk satises peak-selection.
Step 1. The rule f1 satises peaks-selection.
Suppose by contradiction that f1 does not satisfy peak-selection. Let RN 2
RN and let x 2 R be such that f1 (RN) = fxg and x =2 p (RN) : Throughout
the proof, for all j 2 N; let pj := p (Rj) : By e¢ ciency, there are two agents
i; ` 2 N such that pi < x < p`; and p (RN) has no element strictly comprised
between pi and p`. Let u; v 2 R be such that pi < u < x < v < p`: By
strong sovereignty, there are peak-unanimous proles RJ and RK satisfying the
following conditions. Let RJ be such that J \ N = ;; p(RJ) = fug, and u 2
f2(RN ; RJ): Similarly, let RK be such that K \ (N [ J) = ;; p(RK) = fvg, and
v 2 f2(RN ; RK): Let A  f3(RN ; RJ ; RK):We will now show that A has at least
four elements. First, by object-population monotonicity , p(RJ) = fug and u 2
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f2(RN ; RJ) imply that u 2 A: Similarly, by object-population monotonicity ,
p(RK) = fvg and v 2 f2(RN ; RK) imply that v 2 A:
Second, by object-population monotonicity , since f1 (RN) = fxg ; then the
set f2(RN ; RK) has at least one location that is at least as good as x for Ri: Let
y 2 f2(RN ; RK) such that y Ri x. E¢ ciency requires that y  pi: In particular
y < v: Since jf2(RN ; RK)j = 2, it then follows that f2(RN ; RK) = fy; vg : By
e¢ ciency, there exists an agent h 2 N such that ph  y: By object-population
monotonicity , since f2 (RN ; RK) = fy; vg ; then the set A has at least one
location that is at least as good as y for Rh: Let y0 2 A such that y0 Rh y. Since
ph  y; then in particular y0  y < v:
Third, by object-population monotonicity , since f1 (RN) = fxg ; then the
set f2(RN ; RJ) has at least one location that is at least as good as x for R`: Let
z 2 f2(RN ; RJ) such that z R` x: E¢ ciency requires that p`  z: In particular
u < z: Since jf2(RN ; RJ)j = 2, it then follows that f2(RN ; RJ) = fu; zg : By
e¢ ciency, there exists an agent m 2 N such that z  pm: By object-population
monotonicity , since f2 (RN ; RJ) = fu; zg ; then the set A has at least one
location that is at least as good as x for Rm: Let z0 2 A such that z0 Rm z.
Since z  pm; then in particular u < z  z0:
In conclusion, y0 < u < v < z0 are four distinct elements of A; in contradic-
tion with jAj = 3.
Step 2. Let k  1: Suppose that fk satises peak-selection. Then fk+1 also
satises peak-selection.
Let RN 2 RN : If jp(RN)j = k + 1, then by e¢ ciency, fk+1 (RN) = p (RN),
so the claim is true. Suppose then that jp(RN)j > k + 1: We will rst show
that fk+1 (RN) \ p (RN) 6= ;: Since jp(RN)j > k + 1; then p (RN) * fk+1 (RN) :
Let RM be a maximal peak-unanimous subprole of RN , with M  N; such
that p (RM) =2 fk+1 (RN) : Consider the prole RNnM :We have
p  RNnM > k:
From the induction hypothesis, we have fk
 
RNnM
  p  RNnM. By object-
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population monotonicity , we have fk
 
RNnM
  fk+1 (RN) : Thus fk  RNnM 
fk+1 (RN) \ p (RN) : Therefore, fk+1 (RN) \ p (RN) 6= ;:
Let x 2 fk+1 (RN) \ p (RN) : Let RL be the maximal peak-unanimous sub-
prole of RN such that p (RL) = fxg : Then
p  RNnL > k and x =2 p  RNnL :
From the induction hypothesis, we have fk
 
RNnL
  p  RNnL. By object-
population monotonicity , we have fk
 
RNnL
  fk+1 (RN) : Since x 2 fk+1 (RN) ;
then fk
 
RNnL
 [ fxg  fk+1 (RN) : Since x =2 p  RNnL ; then x =2 fk  RNnL :
Thus,
fk  RNnL [ fxg = k+1 = jfk+1 (RN)j : Therefore, fk+1 (RN) = fk  RNnL[
fxg : Therefore, fk+1 (RN)  p (RN) ; the desired conclusion.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 (only if implication): Let f be an arbitrary rule that
satises e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity  and sovereignty.
Step 1: Construction of a candidate priority 2 PT from f .
By peak-selection, for each two compatible peak-unanimous proles RL and
RM ; we have f1 (RL; RM)  p(RL) [ p(RM): Let  be the binary relation over
peak-unanimous proles such that, for each two compatible peak-unanimous
proles RL and RM , we have RL  RM if f1 (RL; RM) = p (RL). By construc-
tion, the relation  is asymmetric and almost complete. It remains to show that
 is almost transitive. Consider three arbitrary peak-unanimous proles RK ,
RL and RM such that RK and RM are compatible. Suppose that RK  RL and
RL  RM . Then in particular, RK and RL are compatible, and RL and RM
are compatible. By denition of , we know that f1 (RK ; RL) = p (RK) and
f1 (RL; RM) = p (RL) : This and object-population monotonicity  imply that
p (RK)  f2 (RK ; RL; RM) and p (RL)  f2 (RK ; RL; RM). By compatibility,
we have p (RK) 6= p (RL) : Therefore f2 (RK ; RL; RM) = p (RK) [ p (RL). But
this and object-population monotonicity  imply that f1 (RK ; RM) = p (RK) ;
i.e. RK  RM ; the desired conclusion. Therefore  is a priority in PT .
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It only remains to show that  belongs to the subset PT : Let RH and RK
be two arbitrary peak-unanimous proles satisfying RH  RK , and let L be
an arbitrary population. By sovereignty, since f1 (RH ; RK) 6= p (RK) ; then
there exists a peak-unanimous prole RM satisfying M \ (H [K [ L) = ;;
and f1 (RH ; RK ; RM) = p (RM) = p (RK) : Since (RK ; RM) is a then a peak-
unanimous prole, we have (RK ; RM)  RH . Therefore 2 PT :
Step 2: Let 2 PT be dened as in step 1 from f: Let RN 2 P1. Let RM and
RL be distinct maximal peak-unanimous subproles of RN such that RM  RL.
Then f1 (RN) 6= p (RL) :
The proof is by induction on jp (RN)j. For jp (RN)j = 2; the claim follows
from the denition of  : Let RN 2 P1 be such that jp (RN)j = n  3; and
suppose that the claim is true for all R0N 0 2 P1 such that jp (R0N 0)j = n 1: Since
n  3; there is a maximal peak-unanimous subprole RH of RN distinct from
both RL and RM ; such that f1 (RN) 6= p (RH) : By the induction hypothesis,
f1
 
RNnH
 6= p (RL) : Let RK be the maximal peak-unanimous subprole of
RN , distinct from both RL and RH ; such that f1
 
RNnH

= p (RK) : Strong
sovereignty ensures that there exists a peak-unanimous prole RJ such that
N \ J = ;; p (RJ) = p (RH), and p (RJ)  f2 (RN ; RJ) : By object-population
monotonicity , we have p (RK)  f2 (RN ; RJ) : Since p (RK) 6= p (RJ) ; thus
f2 (RN ; RJ) = p (RK) [ p (RJ) : By object-population monotonicity , we have
f1 (RN)  p (RK) [ p (RH) : Therefore, f1 (RN) 6= p (RL) ; i.e. the claim is true
for jp (RN)j = n. Thus, it is true for any integer value of jp (RN)j, which proves
the claim.
Step 3: Let  be dened as in step 1 from f: Let (k;RN) be a problem. Let
RM and RL be distinct maximal peak-unanimous subproles of RN such that
RM  RL and p (RL)  fk (RN) : Then p (RM)  fk (RN) :
Let RM and RL satisfying the assumptions of the step. Consider all the max-
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imal peak-unanimous subproles of RN that are distinct from RM and whose
peak location is not contained in fk (RN) : There are exactly m := jp (RN)j k 1
such subproles. Let RM1 ; :::; RMm be these subproles. By step 2, we know that
f1 (RM1 ; :::; RMm ; RM ; RL) 6= p (RL) : Therefore f1 (RM1 ; :::; RMm ; RM ; RL) 
p (RM1[:::[Mm[M) : Next, using object-population monotonicity  k  1 times, we
obtain that fk (RN)\ p (RM1[:::[Mm[M) 6= ;: Since fk (RN)\ p (RM1[:::[Mm) = ;
by denition of the subproles RMk ; therefore p (RM)  fk (RN) ; the desired
conclusion.
It follows from Step 3 that any rule satisfying the axioms is the priority rule
associated with ; where  is dened as in Step 1.
Independence of the axioms We verify that the axioms are independent.
First, the left-peaks rule fLP (like any other rule F n FS) satises all the ax-
ioms but sovereignty. Second, the rule f such that f1 selects the location xm
of the (left)-median voter when k = 1; and such that fk coincides with the
left-peaks rule for all k  2 satises e¢ ciency and sovereignty, but violates
object-population monotonicity . Finally, the rule that locates the rst facility
on the left-majoritarian peak and the remaining facilities at the smallest k   1
positive integers distinct from p(RN) satises object-population monotonicity 
and sovereignty but violates e¢ ciency.19
7 Sovereign and non-sovereign priority rules
Theorem 1 characterizes a proper subset FS of the set F of all priority rules.
We already pointed out that all rules in F n FS satisfy e¢ ciency and object-
population monotonicity , but violate sovereignty. The motivation for introduc-
19Observe that the three axioms imply object-monotonicity, since all priority rules are
object-monotonic. Also, none of the rules in FS satises population-monotonicity, since the
only population-monotonic priority rules are the left peaks rule and the right peaks rule and
these two rules are not in FS :
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ing sovereignty was to eliminate pathological rules that also satisfy e¢ ciency
and object-population monotonicity , but are not priority rules, such as the rule
in Example 8. Requiring sovereignty eliminates all such rules, but also elim-
inates some priority rules, the ones in F n FS: In this section, we show that
the violation of sovereignty is, in some sense, more severe for rules that are not
priority rules than for non-sovereign priority rules.
The domain of any rule is the set
1S
k=1
[fkg  Pk] :We say that a rule f nitely
satises a property Z if, for all nite subset D of
1S
k=1
[fkg  Pk] ; there is a rule
fD that satises Z and coincides with f on D: Obviously, any rule that satises
Z also nitely satises Z. Intuitively, if a rule f does not satisfy an axiom, but
does satisfy it nitely, one should consider that the violation is less severe, than
if it does not even satisfy it nitely.
The gap between satisfying and nitely satisfying a property depends on the
property itself. For some axioms, there is none. For example, if a rule nitely
satises e¢ ciency, then it is e¢ cient. If a rule nitely satises object-population
monotonicity , then it is object-population monotonic . In contrast, it can be
shown that all rules nitely satisfy sovereignty,20 while not all rules are sovereign.
We are interested in rules that nitely satisfy the combination of our three
axioms. These are the rules that coincide on any nite subsetD of
1S
k=1
[fkg  Pk]
with some rule that satises all three axioms,21 i.e. some rule in FS. We have
the following result.
Theorem 2: A rule f is an element of F if and only if it nitely satises
the combination of e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity  and sovereignty.
20The proof of this claim is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.
21This is stronger than the requirement that, for each of the three axions, the rule should
coincide on any nite subset D of
1S
k=1
[fkg  Pk] with some rule that satises this axiom alone.
This weaker requirement is equivalent to e¢ ciency and object-population monotonicity .
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Proof : if implication. Let f be a rule that nitely satises the combination.
Then f coincides on any nite subset D of
1S
k=1
[fkg  Pk] with some priority rule
in FS. Thus, for each problem (k;RN) ; fk (RN) is the image of RN by the k-th
component of some priority rule in FS: Thus, in particular, fk (RN)  p (RN) :
Therefore, f satises peaks-selection. Next, for all two problems (k;RN) and
(k0; R0N 0) ; since f coincides with some priority rule on D = f(k;RN) ; (k0; R0N 0)g ;
then there is no pair of locations (x; y) 2 R2 such that x 2 fk (RN) n fk0 (R0N 0)
and y 2 fk0 (R0N 0) n fk (RN) : Thus, f is a priority rule.
Only if implication. Let f be any arbitrary element of F . Let  be the
priority associated with f . Let D be an arbitrary nite subset of
1S
k=1
[fkg  Pk] :
We will construct a priority rule g 2 FS; such that f and g coincide on D:
Let ID := fi 2 N : i 2 N; for some (k;RN) 2 Dg : Let 0 be the priority such
that for all compatible RM and RN ; we have RM 0 RN if and only if either
(N [M  ID and RM  RN) or (9i 2 N n ID such that 8j 2 M n ID; we have
i > j). Clearly f and g coincide on D; and g 2 FS, the desired conclusion.
Theorem 2 has an interesting topological interpretation. For each k 2 N,
let us endow Xk with the discrete topology (all subsets of Xk are open). Fur-
thermore, let us endow
Q1
k=1XPkk ; the set of all rules, with the corresponding
product topology, which we label the product-discrete topology. Then a rule
nitely satises a property Z if and only if f belongs to the product-discrete
closure of the set of rules satisfying Z: Theorem 2 says that F is the product-
discrete closure of FS: Moreover, we pointed out that the set of all rules is the
closure of the set of sovereign rules. As for the set of e¢ cient rules, the set of
object-population monotonic  rules, and the set of priority rules, they all are
closed.
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8 Other properties
In this section and the next one, we investigate on subclasses of priority rules in
F that satisfy other additional desirable properties, such as anonymity, hiding-
proofness and median-selection. In the next section, we will turn our attention
to strategy-proofness.
A rule f satises anonymity if, for all k  1; and all RN ; R0M 2 Pk
where for all R 2 R; we have jfi 2M : R0i = Rgj = jfi 2 N : Ri = Rgj ; we
have fk(RN) = fk(R0M): A priority  is anonymous if it satises the follow-
ing condition. For all RM ; RN ; R0M 0 ; R
0
N 0 2 T ; such that: (i) RM and RN
are compatible, (ii) R0M 0 and R
0
N 0 are compatible, (iii) for all R 2 R; we
have jfi 2M : Ri = Rgj = jfi 2M 0 : R0i = Rgj ; (iv) for all R 2 R; we have
jfi 2 N : Ri = Rgj = jfi 2 N 0 : R0i = Rgj ; the following equivalence holds
RM  RN , R0M 0  R0N 0 :
We leave it to the reader to verify the following result.
Proposition 1: A priority rule f 2 F satises anonymity if and only if its
priority  is anonymous.
Next, we consider a property that ensures that no agent gains from hiding
from the social planner. Consider a university which has to choose k software
licenses from a larger set of available software for its employees. The decision is
taken through an online poll, to which employees can freely respond. One would
want that no employee has an incentive not to participate in the poll. A rule f
satises hiding-proofness if for each problem k  1, each RN 2 Pk; and each
i 2 N such that RNnfig 2 Pk; we have fk(RN) Ri fk(RNnfig). A priority  is
monotone in population if, for all peak-unanimous proles RL; RN such that RN
andRL are compatible, and any agent i 2 N; we haveRNnfig  RL ) RN  RL:
The following holds.
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Proposition 2: A priority rule f 2 F satises hiding-proofness if and only
if its priority  is monotone in population.
Proof. The if implication is clear. Let us prove the only if implication. Let
f be a priority rule that satises hiding-proofness, associated with the priority
 : Let RL; RN 2 T be such that RN and RL are compatible. Let i 2 N:
Suppose that RNnfig  RL: Then f1
 
RL; RNnfig

= p
 
RNnfig

= p (RN) : This
equality and hiding-proofness imply f1 (RL; RN) = p (RN), which in turn implies
RN  RM , the desired conclusion.
Last, an important rule for selecting a single location in this model is the
one which selects the median peak, for each preference prole RN such that jN j
is odd (Black, 1948). A natural question is thus whether there exists a priority
rule f such that, for any RN such that jN j is odd, the location f1 (RN) is the
median of the peaks. Unfortunately, the answer is negative. In fact we are able
to show a much stronger negative result.
Proposition 3: Let N = f1; :::; 11g: There is no rule f satisfying object-
population monotonicity  and such that, for each RM 2 RM , with M  N such
that jM j is odd, the location f1(RM) is the median of the peaks of the prole
RM :
Proof : By contradiction, suppose that f is such a rule: Consider a prole
RN whose only maximal peak-unanimous subproles Rf1;2;3;4g; Rf5;6g; Rf8;9;10;11g
have peaks locations respectively at 1; 2 and 4: Let R7 be such that p (R7) = 3:
Then, by the median property, we have f1
 
RNnf1;2;3;4g

= 4; f1
 
RNnf5;6g

=
3 and f1
 
RNnf8;9;10;11g

= 1: By object-population monotonicity , we have
f1; 3; 4g  f2 (RN) ; which contradicts jf2 (RN)j = 2:
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9 Strategy-proofness and hierarchical rules
In this section, we investigate on the class of procedures to locate a single
facility that are both the rst component of some priority rule and robust to
the manipulation of preferences. A 1-rule is a mapping g : P1!X1: It can
also be seen as the rst component of a rule. A 1-rule is a 1-priority rule if
it is the rst component of a priority rule. The non-manipulability property
we are interested in requires that truthfully reporting preferences be a (weakly)
dominant strategy in the associated direct revelation game:
A 1-rule g satises strategy-proofness if for each RN 2 P1, each i 2 N
and each R0i 2 R; we have g(RN) Ri g(R0i; R i).
The rst components of the left-peaks rule, the right-peaks rule and of all the
serial dictatorships are strategy-proof priority 1-rules. More generally, the rst
component of any hierarchical rule (see Example 8) is strategy-proof. In fact, we
will show in this section that the hierarchical 1-rules are the only strategy-proof
priority 1-rules.22
9.1 Strategy-proof priority N-schemes
For each population N , an N-scheme is a mapping gN : RN!X1: It can also be
seen as the restriction of a 1-rule to the subset RN : Moulin (1980) introduced
the following class of N -schemes.
An N -scheme gN is a peak-selecting generalized median N -scheme if there
is a list faMgMN of parameters such that aN =  1; a; = +1, and for each
M  N; we have aM 2 f 1;+1g; for all L;M  N; we have L M ) aM 
22The denition of strategy-proofness can be extended to rules in the obvious way. See the
comments at the end of the section.
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aL; and for each RN 2 RN , we have
g(RN) = min
MN

max
i2M
[aM ; p(Ri)]

:
It is well known that peak-selecting generalized median N -schemes are the
only peak selecting strategy-proof N -schemes.23 LetMN be the class of peak-
selecting generalized median N -schemes. We say that a subset M  N is
minimal for the N -scheme g if aM;N =  1 and, for all L  M; we have
aL = +1: In particular, any minimal subset M is nonempty, and is therefore a
subpopulation of N: Clearly, we have
g(RN) = min
MN;
s.t. M is minimal
fmax [p(RM)]g :
We say that an N -scheme gN is a priority N-scheme if there is a priority 1-rule
that coincides with gN onRN :We now provide a description of all strategy-proof
priority N -schemes, in terms of the collection of their minimal sets.
Lemma 3: Let gN be a strategy-proof priority N-scheme. Then, gN is peak-
selecting generalized median. Furthermore, either gN has exactly one minimal
set, or all minimal sets of gN are singletons.
Proof : Since gN is a priority N -scheme, it satises peaks-selection. Since it
is also strategy-proof, then it is a peak-selecting generalized median. Therefore,
it can be described by its minimal sets. By contradiction, suppose that L and
M are two distinct minimal sets for gN ; and that jM j  2: Let j 2 M n L:
Since jM j  2; then M n fjg 6= ;: Since L and M are two distinct minimal
sets for gN ; then L  M; which further implies that N nM 6= ;: The sets fjg;
M n fjg; and N nM form a disjoint partition of N; and none of these sets is
empty.
23This follows from the work of Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994). This family
plays an important role in the work of Jackson and Nicolò (2004), and Cantala (2004).
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Let RN 2 RN be a prole whose maximal peak-unanimous subproles are
RMnfjg; RNnM and Rj and have peak locations respectively at 0; 1 and 2; so
that p(RN) = f0; 1; 2g: Since M is minimal, then for each minimal set K; we
do not have K  M: In particular, we do not have K  M n fjg: Therefore
max[p(RK)]  1: Since this holds for each minimal setK; therefore gN(RN)  1:
Since, however, max[p(RL)] = 1 and L  N n fjg ; then gN(RN) = 1: Thus,
RNnM  RMnfjg:
Next, let R0j be a preference whose peak location is at  1: Let R0N :=
(R0j ; RNnfjg): Then, we have p(R
0
N) = f 1; 0; 1g: Since M is minimal, then
for each minimal set K; we do not have K  M: In particular, we do not have
K  fjg: Therefore max[p(R0K)]  0: Since this holds for each minimal set
K; therefore gN(R0N)  0: Since, however, max[p(R0M)] = 0; then gN(R0N) = 0:
Therefore, R0Mnfjg  R0NnM ; i.e. RMnfjg  RNnM ; which contradicts RNnM 
RMnfjg:
We now provide a convenient description of the family of strategy-proof
priority N -schemes. Consider a pair (C;D) such that C  N and D  N:
Let the N -scheme gN be the (C;D)-oligarchy if exactly one of the following
mutually exclusive conditions holds.
(a). jCj  2, D = ;; and for all RN 2 RN , gN (RN) = min fp (RC)g :
(b). C = ;, jDj  2; and for all RN 2 RN , gN (RN) = max fp (RD)g :
(c). C = D = fig for some i 2 N , and for all RN 2 RN , gN (RN) = p (Ri) :
The (C;D)-oligarchy is not dened for all pairs (C;D) ; only the ones satis-
fying one of the above admissibility conditions. Also, two distinct pairs (C;D)
and (C 0; D0) dene di¤erent oligarchies. In case (a), the scheme is similar to
a left-peaks N -scheme, but it only takes into account a subset C of the pop-
ulation. In case (b), it is similar to a right-peaks N -scheme, but it takes into
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account only a subset D of the population. In case (c), it is the dictatorship
of some agent i: As we will see in Theorem 3, an N -scheme is a strategy-proof
priority N -scheme if and only if it is a (C;D)-oligarchy for some admissible pair
(C;D) :
9.2 Conjugate weak partial orders
In order to be able to characterize strategy-proof priority 1-rules, we introduce
here a few concepts. Two weak partial orders DL and DR on N are conjugate
if for all i; j 2 N such that i 6= j; we have (i DL j) , :(j DR i): Given two
weak partial orders D0 and D00 on N; let the union of D0 and D00 be the binary
relation D on N such that, for all i; j 2 N; we have i D j  (i D0 j or i D00 j):
The following holds.
Lemma 4: LetDL and DR be two conjugate partial orders on N: Then the
union D of DL and DR is a weak ordering.
Proof. We leave it to the reader to verify that the relation D is reexive and
complete. We will prove that it is transitive. Let i; j; k be arbitrary elements of
N, such that i D j, and j D k. We will prove that i D k. If i; j and k are not
three distinct integers, the claim is obviously true. Suppose then that i; j and
k are three distinct integers. Four cases may arise. Case 1: iDL j, and j DL k:
Then by transitivity of DL; we have i DL k: Case 2: i DR j, and j DR k: Then
by transitivity of DR; we have iDR k: Case 3: iDL j, and j DR k: Since iDL j;
i 6= j; and DL and DR are conjugates, therefore :(j DR i): By transitivity of
DR; and since j DR k and :(j DR i); therefore :(k DR i): Since k 6= i; and DL
and DR are conjugates, this is equivalent to iDL k: Case 4: iDR j, and j DL k:
Following a reasoning symmetric to Case 3, we can prove that iDR k: In all four
cases we proved, either that iDL k; or that iDR k: Therefore, in all four cases,
iD k; the desired conclusion, holds.
30
Lemma 5: Let DL and DR be two conjugate weak partial orders. Let T  N be
an indi¤erence class for the union D of DL and DR with at least two elements.
Then, T is an indi¤erence class, either for DL; or for DR; but not for both.
Proof. Throughout the proof, let ./; ./L; and ./R denote the respective
indi¤erence relations associated with D; DL and DR:We will rst show that for
all i; j 2 T; such that i 6= j; and i ./ j; we have either i ./L j or i ./R j; but not
both. Let i; j 2 T be two such agents. Since DL and DR are conjugates and
i 6= j, we cannot have i DL j and j DR i: For the same reason, we cannot have
i DR j and j DL i: Therefore, either i ./L j; or i ./R j; but not both. If T has
exactly two elements, there is nothing left to prove. Assume then that T has at
least three elements.
Next, we will show that for all three distinct i; j; k 2 T; we have either
i ./L j ./L k; or i ./R j ./R k; but not both. We will rst show that i ./L j ./R k
cannot hold. Suppose, by contradiction, that these relations hold. Then, on
the one hand, we have i DL j DR k: By Case 3 in the proof of Lemma 4, this
implies that i DL k: But, also, on the other hand, we have k DR j DL i: By
Case 4 in the proof of Lemma 4, this implies that k DR i: Thus we have i 6= k;
iDL k and kDR i; which contradicts that DL and DR are conjugates. Therefore,
i ./L j ./R k cannot hold. A symmetric reasoning shows that i ./R j ./L k
cannot hold either. Therefore, we have either i ./L j ./L k; or i ./R j ./R k;
but not both. Since this holds for all distinct i; j; k 2 T; it follows that T is
an indi¤erence class, either for DL; or for DR; but not for both, the desired
conclusion.
9.3 Strategy-proof priority 1-rules
We are now ready to provide a characterization of all strategy-proof priority
1-rules. We describe this set in two ways.
Under the rst description, each such 1-rule is viewed as the collection of
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the N -schemes it induces: Each of them is a (CN ; DN)-oligarchy. Moreover the
parameters (CN ; DN) are linked across population, in a way which will be made
clear. We describe the exact nature of the linkage. In the second description,
we focus on the priority itself and show that it is hierarchical, as dened in
Example 4. We are now ready to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 3: Let g be a 1-rule. The three following statements are equivalent.
(i) : g is a strategy-proof priority 1-rule.
(ii) : There are conjugate weak partial orders DL and DR such that, for each
population N; the 1-rule g induces the (CN ; DN)-oligarchic N-scheme gN
on N; with CN = fi 2 N : 8j 2 N; i DL jg and DN = fi 2 N : 8j 2
N; iDR jg:
(iii) : g is a hierarchical 1-rule.
Proof: (iii) =) (i) : A hierarchical rule g is obviously a priority 1-rule. It
remains to show that it is strategy-proof. Let N be an arbitrary population.
Let gN be the N -scheme induced by g on N: Let T be the highest priority class
of agents in the hierarchy such that T \ N 6= ;: Then either, for all prole
RN 2 RN ; we have gN (RN) = min [p (RN\T )] or, for all prole RN 2 RN ; we
have gN (RN) = max [p (RN\T )] : In both cases, the N -scheme gN is strategy-
proof, the desired conclusion.
(i) =) (ii). By Lemma 3, either gN has a single minimal set and this set
is not a singleton, or it contains more than one minimal set and they are all
singletons, or it contains a single set and it is a singleton. Clearly, these three
cases are mutually exclusive. In the rst case, let CN be the union of the many
singleton sets for gN ; and let DN  ;: In the second case, let DN be unique (non
singleton) minimal set; and let CN  ;: In the third and last case, let i be the
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unique element of the unique minimal set, and let CN  fig; and DN  fig:
Clearly, for each N , the pair (CN ; DN) satises conditions (a), (b) and (c) of the
denition of an oligarchic 1-rule. Next, let DL and DR be two binary relations
on N dened as follows. For all i; j 2 N; let (i DL j) , (i 2 Cfi;jg or i = j);
and let (i DR j) , (i 2 Dfi;jg or i = j): We will prove that DL;DR satisfy the
requirements of statement (ii) in three steps.
Step 1. The binary relations DL and DR are transitive. We will only prove
that DL is transitive. The proof that DR is transitive follows a symmetric
reasoning. Let i; j and k be three agents such that iDL j and j DL k: We claim
that iDL k holds. If these agents are not all distinct, then our claim is obvious.
Suppose then that they are distinct. Let the preferences Ri; Rj and Rk have
their respective peak locations at  1; 0 and 1: Then, on the one hand, i DL j
and i 6= j imply that i 2 Cfi;jg: Since p(Ri) =  1 < 0 = p(Rj); it follows that
g(Ri; Rj) =  1: Since g is the priority rule associated with ; this implies that
Ri  Rj: By a similar reasoning, we can show that jDL k implies that Rj  Rk.
By almost transitivity, we obtain Ri  Rk. Therefore, g(Ri; Rk) =  1: Since
p(Ri) =  1 < 1 = p(Rk); this implies that i 2 Cfi;kg: Therefore, we have iDL k:
Therefore, DL is transitive, the desired conclusion.
Step 2. The weak partial orders DL and DR are conjugate. Let i; j 2 N
such that i 6= j and i DL j: Then i 2 Cfi;jg and i 6= j: Therefore Dfi;jg  fig : In
particular, j =2 Dfi;jg and i 6= j: Therefore, : (j DR i), the desired conclusion.
Step 3. For all N; we have CN = fi 2 N : 8j 2 N; i DL jg and DN =
fi 2 N : 8j 2 N; i DR jg: We will only prove the claim for CN : The proof of
the claim for DN follows a symmetric reasoning. First we prove that CN 
fi 2 N : 8j 2 N; i DL jg: Let i 2 CN and j 2 N: We will prove that i DL j:
Let RN be a prole whose only maximal peak-unanimous subproles are Ri;
Rj and RNnfi;jg and have their respective peak locations at  1; 0 and 1: Then
g(RN) = min[p(RCN )] =  1: This implies that Ri  Rj: Therefore, g(Ri;j) =
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 1, i.e. i DL j: Second, we prove that fi 2 N : 8j 2 N; i DL jg  CN : Let
i 2 fi 2 N : 8j 2 N; i DL jg: We will prove that i 2 CN : Let j1; : : : ; jl be
the elements of N n i: Let RN be a prole such that p (Ri) := 0 and for all
k = 1; :::; l; we have p (Rjl) := l: For all k = 1; : : : ; l; we have iDL jk; therefore
g(Ri;jk) =  1; therefore Ri  Rjk : Since this holds for all k = 1; : : : ; l and g
is a priority rule, it follows that g(RN) =  1 = p(Ri): Therefore i 2 CN ; the
desired conclusion.
(ii) =) (iii). Let the statement (ii) hold. We will proceed in two steps.
First, we will construct a candidate hierarchical priority . Second, we will
show that g is indeed the 1-rule associated with this priority.
Step 1: Denition of a candidate hierarchical priority. Let  be binary
relation on T dened as follows. Let D be the union of DL and DR : Then
D is a weak ordering of N, such that each indi¤erence class W for D is either
an indi¤erence class for DL; or for DR; but not for both. Let  be the weak
ordering on T dened as follows. For all RM ; RN 2 T , we have RM  RN
if there is i 2 M such that for all j 2 N [ M; we have i D j. Let T be
the set of non-singleton indi¤erence classes for  in T . Then, for each non
singleton indi¤erence class T 2 T, there is a (unique) indi¤erence class WT
for D in N, such that T = fRN 2 T : N \WT 6= ;g : We know that for each
class T 2 T, the class WT satises exactly one of the following two mutually
exclusives conditions. Either it is a non-singleton indi¤erence class for DL; or
it is a non-singleton indi¤erence class for DR. We will now dene a priority
T over each non-singleton indi¤erence class T 2 T. If WT is a non-singleton
indi¤erence class for DL, then let T be the left peaks priority over T: If instead
WT is a non-singleton indi¤erence class for DL, then let T be the right peaks
priority over T: The tuple
 ; (T )T2T denes a hierarchical priority .
Step 2: g is the priority 1-rule associated with  : We know that each of
the N -schemes gN satises peaks selection. Thus g satises peaks selection. Let
34
RN be an arbitrary prole. Let RL be the maximal peak-unanimous subprole
of RN such that g (RN) = p (RL) : We will show that this implies that for all
other maximal peak-unanimous subprole RM of RN ; we have RL  RM : To
do so, we will distinguish three mutually exclusive cases. Case 1: jCN j  2:
Then p (RL) = min fp (RCN )g : Since it is nonempty, the set CN is the highest
indi¤erence class for D in N and is also an indi¤erence class for DL : This
and p (RL) = min fp (RCN )g implies that RL  RM ; for all maximal peak-
unanimous proles RM in RN that are distinct from RL: Case 2: jDN j  2:
Then p (RL) = max fp (RDN )g : Since it is nonempty, the set DN is the highest
indi¤erence class for D in N and is also an indi¤erence class for DR : This and
p (RL) = min fp (RCN )g implies thatRL  RM ; for all maximal peak-unanimous
proles RM in RN that are distinct from RL: Case 3: CN = DN = fig for some
i 2 N . Then i is the sole element in the highest indi¤erence class for D in N .
As a consequence, whichever maximal peak-unanimous prole of RN has agent
i enjoys the highest priority for . Since g (RN) = p (RL) ; therefore i 2 L:
Therefore, RL  RM ; for all maximal peak-unanimous subproles RM of RN
that are distinct from RL: Therefore, g is the hierarchical 1-rule associated with
the priority , the desired conclusion.
Finally, we should point out that, although we dened strategy-proofness
for 1-rules, the denition can easily be adapted for rules. It is easy to see that
hierarchical rules are strategy-proof. Thus, our results in this section also imply
that the only strategy-proof rules are the hierarchical rules.
We conclude with the following additional observations. All of the hier-
archical rules satisfy hiding-proofness. However, the left-peaks rule and the
right-peaks rule are the only anonymous hierarchical rules. Each majoritarian
rule is hiding-proof and anonymous, but it is not a hierarchical rule, i.e. it is
not strategy-proof. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a hierarchical pri-
ority  to satisfy sovereignty is that the weak ordering D of the agents that is
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associated with it should have no maximal element.
10 Conclusion
In this paper we undertake the task of designing rules for the provision of mul-
tiple public facilities to populations of agents with single peaked preferences
over the real line. To this end, we introduce two new axioms object-population
monotonicity  and sovereignty. We uncover and characterize a rich and inter-
esting family of rules, the priority rules. Some rules in the family are appealing,
for example the majoritarian rules. Unfortunately, no priority rule coincides
with the median for each problem of providing exactly one public facility to an
odd population of agents. On the positive side, the structure of the rules in the
family is very simple, which makes it possible to characterize several subfamilies
on the basis of anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In partic-
ular, strategy-proof priority rules form the interesting subfamily of hierarchical
rules.
We view our work as an initial step towards a comprehensive understanding
of the implications of normative and strategic axioms in the problem of locating
multiple facilities. An obvious question is whether it is possible to generalize
Moulins (1980) generalized median voter schemes to this more complex setting.
We only provide a partial answer to this question. The priority structure enables
us to generalize only a particular type of generalized median voter scheme, the
oligarchies. A generalization of the entire family of generalized median voter
schemes to the problem of locating multiple facilities requires a exibility which
conicts with the priority structure, and thus with our main axioms.
Our analysis is based on a particular way to extend preferences over single-
locations to preferences over multiple locations, the max-extension, introduced
by Miyagawa (1998, 2001). The work of Miyagawa seems to indicate that the
max-extension is not very tractable, in the sense that it leads to characteriza-
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tions of rules that are not particularly appealing, such as the left peaks rule
and the right peaks rule, and other more complicated rules. As our results
suggest, this may have more to do with the solidarity axioms used there than
the max-extension itself. As Gordon (2007a) has shown, solidarity axioms have
strong general implication in all public decisions models, of which the location
of multiple public facilities is a special case. Nevertheless, both Miyagawa and
us obtain highly discontinuous rules, for any natural topology. This seems to be
a regular feature of the max-extension model. Thus, insisting on continuity in
this model may be too strong a requirement. Majoritarian rules, for instance,
are not continuous.
However, a natural extension of our work would be precisely to study what
happens under other types of preference extensions, e.g. the lexicographic ex-
tension. Ehlers (2002, 2003) studies the same axioms as Miyagawa (1998, 2001)
under the lexicographic extension and obtains strikingly di¤erent characteriza-
tions. So, it is quite possible that the axioms we used here would lead to other
families of rules as well, if one were to replace the max-extension of our model
with the lexicographic extension, or some other extension.
Finally, we have considered here the pure public goods case. Richer set-ups
include problems with congestion and cost-sharing to nance the facilities, such
as in the model by Jackson and Nicolò (2004), for the case k = 1. We leave this
and the other questions open for future research.
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